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A PATRIOTIC PLAYGROUND: REEXAMINING
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE DAILY
RECITATION OF THE PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE
IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
"The inclusion of God in our pledge therefore would
further acknowledge the dependence of our people and our
Government upon the moral directions of the Creator. At
the same time it would serve to deny the atheistic and
materialistic concepts of communism with its attendant
subservience of the individual ... [T]he children of our
land, in the daily recitation of the pledge in school, will be
daily impressed with a true understanding of our way of
life and its origins. As they grow and advance in this
understanding,they will assume the responsibilitiesof selfgovernment equipped to carry on the traditions that have
been given to us. Fortify our youth in their allegiance to
the flag by their declarationto 'one Nation, under God.
I. INTRODUCTION
Although the foundation of the American government is strongly
rooted in the concept of separation of church and state, religious references
are ever-present in our Nation's currency, on insignia in state and federal
buildings, and most notably, in the language of the Pledge of Allegiance
("Pledge") 2 Traditionally, litigants have argued in vain that the recitation
of the Pledge of Allegiance in public schools violates the Establishment
Clause, while arguments involving Equal Protection have remained in the
background as a secondary issue. 3 With the Massachusetts Supreme

' H.R. REP. NO. 83-1693 (1954), reprintedin 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2339, 2340-41.
2 See John E. Thompson, Note, What's the Big Deal? The Unconstitutionalityof God in the
Pledge ofAllegiance, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 563, 577 (2003) (noting religious references in
various government practices used in condoning government sponsorship of religion); see also
Caroline Mala Corbin, Nonbelievers and Government Speech, 97 IOWA L. REv. 347, 399 (2012)
(discussing how seemingly harmless government expressions of religion perpetuate stereotypes of
nonbelievers).
3 See Susan Gellman & Susan Looper-Friedman, Thou Shalt Use the Equal Protection
Clausefor Religion Cases (Not Just the Establishment Clause), 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 665, 666
(2008) (arguing government expressions of religion should be primarily analyzed under Equal
Protection Clause). The Equal Protection Clause is better suited for government expressions of
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Judicial Court's ("SJC") decision in Doe v. Acton-Boxborough Regional
School District,4 a new argument against the recitation of the Pledge in
public schools has been formed out of the remains of the traditional

constitutional argument.5
The appellants, echoing the same Equal Protection argument used
to legalize same-sex marriage in the Commonwealth, argued that the daily
recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance violated their rights as atheists and
Humanists under the Equal Rights Amendment to the Massachusetts
Constitution.6 Although the Supreme Judicial Court did not find for the
plaintiffs, the strategic advocacy choice employed in Doe will impact the
way litigants approach this issue, particularly in those jurisdictions that
have similarly legalized same-sex marriage under their state's Equal Rights
Amendment. 7

religion, given that the hanm in such instances is marginalization, rather than proselytization. See
id. at 702; cf Lorianne Sainsbury-Wong, Benjamin Wilson & Alyssa Vangeli, The Useful But
Overlooked Massachusetts EqualRights Amendment, M.B.A. MASS. LAW. J., August 2011, at 14,
17 (August 2011), available at http://massbar.org/publications/lawyers-journal/2011/august/theuseful-but-overlooked-massachusetts-equal-rights-amendment
(discussing
SJC's
broad
application of equal protection under Massachusetts Constitution).
4 8 N.E.3d 737 (Mass. 2014).
5 See Doe, 8 N.E.3d at 745-46 (noting limited nature of plaintiffs' constitutional claim); see
also Tim Martin, Pledge Allegiance to a Foreign-Made Flag? Kids Deserve Better, GUEST
OPINION/EuREKA TIMES STANDARD (Oct. 27, 2013, 2:17:58 AM PDT), http://www.timesstandard.com/guest opinion/ci 24397445/pledge-allegiance-foreign-made-flag-kids-deservebetter (highlighting plaintiffs' unique departure from Pledge jurisprudence by arguing under state,
rather than federal law).
6 See Doe, 8 N.E.3d at 740; see also Steve Annear, BULaw Professor:Pledge Case Before
Supreme Courtis 'Unique, 'BOSTON MAGAZINE, (Sept. 5, 2013, 3:27 PM),
http://www.bostonmagazine.com/news/blog/2013/09/05/pledge-of-allegiance-massachusettsunder-god-supreme-judicial-court/ (arguing plaintiffs' argument, while novel, still poses difficult
challenge); Kimberly Winston, Mass. Supreme Courtto Hear Challenge to Pledge, ON
FAITHIWASHINGTON POST

(August 30, 2013), http://ncronline.org/news/faith-parish/mass-

supreme-court-hear-challenge-pledge-allegiance ("This change of tack in pledge challenges is
modeled on a successful precedent laid down in the same court on gay marriage.").
7 See infra Part III (discussing similarities between same-sex marriage litigation and Pledge
of Allegiance litigation); sources cited supra note 6 (recognizing similarities between arguments
and potential impact on litigation in same-sex marriage and Pledge cases); see also 'Under God'
No Goodfor New Jersey School Students, Says Humanist Group, AHA NEwS (Feb. 19, 2014),
http://americanhumanist.org/news/details/2014-02-under-god-no-good-for-new-jersey-schoolstudents-say (summarizing similar case in New Jersey). The American Humanist Society
("AHA"), a plaintiff in Doe, sent a letter to the Superintendent of the Matawan-Aberdeen
Regional School District in New Jersey, alleging that the daily recitation of the Pledge violated
the New Jersey Constitution. See 'Under God' No Goodfor New Jersey School Students, Says
Humanist Group, supra. After the school district failed to remedy the situation, the AHA filed
suit on behalf of a local family. See Humanists File Lawsuit Against 'Under God' in the Pledge
ojfAllegiance in New Jersey, AHA NEWS (Apr. 21, 2014),
http://americanhumanist.org/news/details/2014-04-humanists-file-lawsuit-against-under-god-inthe-pled (comparing New Jersey case to Massachusetts case).
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Although there is arguably a viable claim that the inclusion of the
phrase "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance is a violation of the
Establishment Clause, this note instead addresses the issue of whether the
inclusion of such language violates the Equal Protection Clause.8 This note
will first describe the circumstances that led to the litigation in Doe v.
Acton-Boxborough, the plaintiffs' novel argument against the Pledge, and
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts's ultimate decision. 9 It will
then discuss the history of the Pledge, as well as the numerous failed
attempts to challenge its constitutionality under the Establishment Clause. °
This note will then review the steps of an Equal Protection Analysis, and
go on to address the Equal Rights Amendment ("ERA") to the
Massachusetts Constitution, and similar provisions in other state
constitutions, as well as discuss how a number of states have shown a
willingness to broaden the rights afforded to their citizens under their
state's constitution." Following this is an analysis of whether the daily
recitation of the Pledge in public schools creates a suspect classification,
resulting in a disparate impact on atheists and other nonbelievers and thus
violating the Massachusetts Constitution as well as other similarly drafted
state constitutions.12
The conclusion provides insight into the most
advantageous forums for practitioners to litigate this issue and argue that
the state-mandated daily recitation of the Pledge violates their state's Equal
Rights Amendment. 3
II. THE NOVEL ARGUMENT CHALLENGING THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PLEDGE
In Massachusetts, public school teachers are required to begin each
day with a classroom recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance.14 The purpose
of this practice is to instill values of patriotism and good citizenship among
the students.' 5 Jane and John Doe, individually and on behalf of their three
children, together with the AHA, brought action challenging the Pledge
statute against the Acton-Boxborough Regional School District, the Town
8 See infra Parts II-V.
9 See infra Part II.
10 See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part III.B.
12 See infra Part IV.
13 See infra Part V.
14 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 71, § 69 (2012) ("Pledge statute") (providing for daily
recitation of Pledge in all public schools).
15 See Opinions of the Justices to the Governor, 363 N.E.2d 251, 255 (Mass. 1977)
(discussing Legislature's purpose in enacting Pledge statute).
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of Acton Public Schools, and the Superintendent.16
The plaintiffs in Doe, as atheists and Humanists, alleged that this
17
practice violated their rights under the Massachusetts Constitution.
Curiously, the plaintiffs brought their claim specifically under the
Massachusetts Constitution, and avoided any argument under the Federal
Constitution.' 8 The plaintiffs argued that the Commonwealth's Pledge
statute promoted and defined patriotism in terms that favor one class (God
believers) over another (atheists) by portraying God-belief as a key element
of patriotism. 19

In their complaint, plaintiffs' reasoned that this daily affirmation,
that the United States is a nation "under God," has made them feel
excluded and marginalized, just as Jews or Muslims would feel if they were
told on a daily basis that the United States was "under Jesus. 2 0 Therefore,
16

See Doe v. Acton-Boxborough Reg'l Sch. Dist., 8 N.E.3d 737, 740 (Mass. 2014)

(indicating parties to action). The American Humanist Association advocates for humanists and
nontheists, and "strive[s] to bring about a progressive society where being good without a god is
an accepted and respected way to live life."
AMERICAN HUMANIST ASSOCIATION,
http://americanhumanist.org/AHA (last visited Mar. 2, 2014) (fighting for defense of civil
liberties and secular government). Notably, the Knights of Columbus, an organization that was
instrumental in amending the Pledge to include the words "under God" in 1954, intervened as a
defendant. See Doe, 8 N.E.3d at 737 n.3 (listing Knights of Columbus as intervener); see also
Todd Collins, Lost in the Forest of the Establishment Clause: Elk Grove v. Newdow, 27

L. REv. 1, 16 (2004) (describing history of Knights of Columbus's involvement in
adding "under God" to Pledge).
17 See Brief of the Plaintiffs-Appellants, Doe v. Acton-Boxborough Reg'l Sch. Dist., 8
N.E.3d 737 (Mass. 2014) (No. SJC-11317), 2012 WL 8684858, at *11-12 [hereinafter Plaintiffs'
Brie] (arguing phrase "under God" in the Pledge asserts, "theistic supremacy, directly
disaffirming plaintiffs' religious beliefs"); Complaint at 5, Doe v. Acton-Boxborough Reg'l Sch.
Dist., No. MICV2010-04261 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 5, 2012) [hereinafter Complaint] ("Despite
[plaintiffs' religious beliefs], on a daily basis the defendants' public schools assert, through an
official, school-sponsored ceremony, that in fact the Does' religious views are wrong.").
Plaintiffs reasoned that the language of the Pledge of Allegiance affirms that the nation is in fact
"under God" and therefore favors monotheistic students, classifying them as quintessential
patriots, while necessarily classifying non-theistic students, such as the plaintiffs, as less patriotic
or even unpatriotic. Complaint, supra, at 12; cf Corbin, supra note 2, at 399 (asserting phrase
"under God" in Pledge links God and patriotism, thereby embodying and perpetuating
stereotypes). Plaintiffs' "hold and affirm religious views that are Humanists. With regard to the
existence of a divinity, [plaintiffs] are atheists, as they do not accept the existence of any type of
God or gods." Complaint, supra, at 2 (discussing Doe family's religious beliefs).
18See Plaintiffs' Brief supra note 17, at *13-14 (asserting Superior Court's erroneously
relied on federal precedent because plaintiffs are not raising federal claims).
19 See Reply Brief of the Plaintiffs-Appellants, Doe v. Acton-Boxborough Reg'l Sch. Dist., 8
N.E.3d 737 (Mass. 2014) (No. SJC-11317), 2013 WL 3858253, at *1 [hereinafter Plaintiffs'
Reply] (rebutting defendants' assertion that plaintiffs are not classified or treated differently than
any other students). "The exercise denies atheists and Humanists the ability to meaningfully
participate in an official patriotic practice that favors similarly situated Christians and other Godbelievers." Id.
20 Complaint, supra note 17, at 5. During oral arguments, Chief Justice Ireland poked fun at
CAMPBELL

36

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. XX

the plaintiffs maintained that the daily recitation stigmatized atheists and
perpetuated existing prejudices.21
During oral arguments, plaintiffs'
counsel noted the long history of prejudice and animosity towards atheists
and nontheists in this country.2 2 Furthermore, while participation is not
compulsory, the Doe children wished to "stand and participate with their
schoolmates as equals. 23
The plaintiffs alleged that they had suffered and continue to suffer

actual harm as a result of the defendants' actions, "thereby having their
religious beliefs publically rejected, having their patriotism and the
patriotism of their religious class brought into question, and being

portrayed as outsiders and second-class citizens. ,,24 However, plaintiffs
were unable to present any evidence that they had been treated, or even

the plaintiffs' argument by asking plaintiffs' counsel to repeat what the court officer said when
the session opened. See Oral Argument at 2:15, Doe v. Acton-Boxborough Reg'l Sch. Dist., 8
N.E.3d
737
(Mass.
2014)
(No.
SJC-11317),
available
at
http://www2.suffolk.edu/sjc/archive/2013/SJC11317.html (noting courts across Massachusetts
are opened with "God save the Commonwealth"). In response, plaintiffs' counsel argued that
opening session with "God save the Commonwealth" is a truly ceremonial act, unlike the daily
recitation of the Pledge in public schools, which is an affirmation of patriotism and an
indoctrination of the belief that this country is "one Nation under God." See id at 3:17.
21 See Plaintiffs' Reply, supra note 19, at *1 (arguing stigmatization creates suspect
classification between god-believers and non-believers).
But see Brief of the
Defendants/Interveners-Appellees, Doe v. Acton-Boxborough Reg'l Sch. Dist., 8 N.E.3d 737
(Mass. 2014) (No. SJC-11317), 2013 WL 3858255, at *27 [hereinafter Interveners' BrieJ]
(contending stigmatization alone does not warrant equal protection claim absent denial of equal
treatment).
22 See Oral Argument, supra note 20, at 11:57 (highlighting that not one of 535 congressmen
and representatives in this country is openly atheist).
23 Plaintiffs' Brief supra note 17, at *11; Complaint, supra note 17, at 6 (stating Doe
children want to meaningfully participate in ceremony that does not discriminate against them).
Plaintiffs asserted that the exercise itself still discriminates, regardless of its voluntary nature. See
Oral Argument, supra note 20, at 9:47. Furthermore, the plaintiffs maintained that the daily
recitation of the Pledge in Massachusetts public schools perpetuates the negative preconceptions
about atheists and non-believers by essentially classifying them as outsiders in our society and in
turn regarding them as second-class citizens. See Plaintiffs'Brief supra note 17, at *10; Brief of
Amicus Curiae Center for Inquiry, Doe v. Acton-Boxborough Reg'l Sch. Dist., 8 N.E.3d 737
(Mass. 2014) (No. SJC-11317), 2013 WL 6850789, at *9-10 [hereinafter Inquiry Brie] ("It is
impermissible for the State to condition the benefit of participation in a public school group
activity on a pupil's renunciation of her religious beliefs, even when participation in the activity is
voluntary."); see also Corbin, supra note 2 at 398-99 (arguing government expressions of religion
perpetuate negative stereotypes that atheists are immoral and unpatriotic). Corbin addressed the
history of persistent distrust of nonbelievers and noted that atheism is often linked with a lack of
patriotism. See Corbin, supra note 2, at 366.
24 Complaint, supra note 17, at 6; see Doe v. Acton-Boxborough Reg'l Sch. Dist., 8 N.E.3d
737, 742 (Mass. 2014) ("[Plaintiffs] claimed that it is inappropriate for their children to have to
draw attention to themselves by not participating, possibly leading to unwanted attention,
criticism and potential bullying, and that at their children's ages, fitting in is an important
psychological need.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
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perceived, any differently by school administrators,
teachers, or other
25
students because of their religious beliefs.
The defendants relied on federal precedent and the United States
Constitution and argued that the plaintiffs' equal protection claim under the
Massachusetts Constitution must fail. 26 The defendants' argument hinged
on the voluntary nature of the daily exercise, reasoning that if any
classification exists, it is the individual students, not the statute or even the
School Districts, who create such classification.2 7 During oral arguments,
25

Doe, 8 N.E.3d at 749 ("[T]here is nothing empirical or even anecdotal in the summary

judgment record to support a claim that the children actually have been treated or perceived by
others as 'outsiders,' 'second-class citizens,' or 'unpatriotic.').
26 See Brief of the Defendants-Appellees, Doe v. Acton-Boxborough Reg'l Sch. Dist.,
8
N.E.3d 737 (Mass. 2014) (No. SJC-11317), 2013 WL 3858252, at *3 [hereinafter Defendants'
Brie] (maintaining that equal protection standards under Massachusetts Constitution are identical
to those under Fourteenth Amendment). The defendants reasoned that this was significant
because the federal circuit courts have consistently held that the voluntary recitation of the Pledge
in public schools does not violate the United States Constitution. See id.at *34; see also Brief
for Amici Curiae Alliance Defending Freedom and Massachusetts Family Institute, Doe v. ActonBoxborough Reg'l Sch. Dist., 8 N.E.3d 737 (Mass. 2014) (No. SJC-11317), 2013 WL 3858254,
at * 11-12 [hereinafter Alliance Brie] (arguing protections under Federal Constitution are broader
than those under Massachusetts Constitution). The Alliance Brief reasoned that the United States
Constitution provides greater protection than the Massachusetts Constitution because the latter
prohibits discrimination based on specific enumerated classes of people, whereas the former
prohibits all discrimination. See Alliance Brief supra, at *12. But see Goodridge v. Dep't of
Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 959 (Mass. 2003) (emphasizing Massachusetts Constitution
provides broader protection than Federal Constitution). In its decision in Goodridge, the SJC
reasoned that the Massachusetts Constitution protects "both 'freedom from' unwarranted
government intrusion ...
and 'freedom to' partake in benefits created by the State for the common
good." Id.
27 See Defendants' Brief supra note 26, at *13-16 (reasoning statute does not mandate
different treatment of, or confer benefit to, any religious class); see also Interveners' Brief supra
note 21, at *14 (arguing right to opt out does not create a discriminatory classification). But see
Oral Argument, supra note 20, at 19:21 (showing Justice Lenk note to defense counsel "it's hard
for a six-year-old to opt out"); Inquiry Brief supra note 23, at *17 ("That a school activity is
voluntary does not immunize it from a challenge to a classification scheme that bars a class of
individuals from participating."). In addition, the defendants-interveners reason that the words
"under God" do not classify people according to religion "any more than the word 'allegiance'
can be said to classify people into groups of citizens and non-citizens." Interveners' Brief supra
note 21, at * 14. Furthermore, since the Pledge is a statement of political philosophy rather than a
religious statement, the defendants-interveners argue that it cannot be said to classify people on
the basis of religion. See id.at *17-19 (demonstrating Pledge was designed as statement of
political philosophy and national loyalty); see also Amicus Curiae Brief of the American Center
for Law and Justice in Support of Defendants-Appellees, Doe v. Acton-Boxborough Reg'l Sch.
Dist., 8 N.E.3d 737 (Mass. 2014) (No. SJC-11317), 2013 WL 3858256, at *3-6 [hereinafterAChJ
Brie] (reasoning phrase "one Nation under God" in Pledge "describes an indisputable historical
fact"). But see H.R. REP. No. 83-1693 (1954), reprintedin 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2339, 2340 ("The
inclusion of God in our pledge therefore would further acknowledge the dependence of our
people and our Government upon the moral directions of the Creator. At the same time it would
serve to deny the atheistic and materialistic concepts of communism."); Plaintiffs' Reply, supra
note 19, at *8 ("The exercise takes place on school property, during class time, and is even led by
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defense counsel emphasized that there was no language implicating
religion in the Pledge statute, and that the only religious language is in the
language of the Pledge itself.28 In addition, defense counsel argued that

notwithstanding this religious language, the Pledge is not an affirmation,
but rather it is a statement of our political philosophy. 29 As such, the
defendants' asserted that since the Pledge statute does not create a
classification on its face, the plaintiffs were required to prove
discriminatory intent in order to prevail on their claim. 0
The Massachusetts Pledge statute, as the defendants argued, did not
violate the Massachusetts Constitution because it applied equally to both
theistic and non-theistic students, given that a student could elect to abstain
from participation for any or no reason at all. 3' Furthermore, during oral
arguments, defense counsel called attention to the fact that the plaintiffs
failed to offer any evidence of a single student anywhere in the
Commonwealth that claimed to have been forced or pressured into reciting
the Pledge since "under God" was added in 1954.32 However, the plaintiffs
rebutted the defendants' assertion by reasoning that an atheist student could
only gain the same benefit from this daily patriotic exercise as his or her
a school official. These facts establish state action for ERA purposes."). The plaintiffs
emphasize that while voluntariness is a central element to First Amendment analysis; it is
irrelevant for Equal Protection analysis. See Plaintiffs 'Reply, supra note 19, at *8; see also Oral
Argument, supra note 20, at 26:29 (discussing how voluntariness affects equal protection
analysis). When defense counsel argued that there was no equal protection violation because
recitation was voluntary, Justice Lenk quickly asserted "voluntariness has nothing to with equal
protection analysis, does it?" Oral Argument, supra note 20, at 26:29.
28 Oral Argument, supra note 20, at 20:17; see MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 71, § 69 (2012)
(providing for daily recitation of Pledge in all public schools).
29 Oral Argument, supra note 20, at 20:23 ("[Pledge] is a statement of our political
philosophy ...
that our rights did not come from the king, or the tsar, or the queen, they came

from something higher ...
innate.").
30 See Interveners'Briefsupra note 21, at *28-29 (noting plaintiffs have offered no evidence

that named defendants had any discriminatory intent). Although the plaintiffs' cited Congress'
intent in adding the phrase "under God" to the Pledge, and in turn argue that Congress did in fact
have a discriminatory intent, the defendants-interveners noted that Congress was not a named
defendant in this case, and therefore their intent, however discriminatory it might have been, was
irrelevant. See id.at 29. But see Plaintiffs' Reply, supra note 19, at *13-19 (citing Goodridge
and other Massachusetts cases, plaintiffs argue ERA does not have "discriminatory intent"
requirement); see also Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 971-72 (Greaney, J., concurring) ("That our
marriage laws, unlike antimiscegenation laws, were not enacted purposely to discriminate in no
way neutralizes their present discriminatory character.").
31 See Defendants' Brief supra note 26, at *13-14 (reasoning no religious classification
because students may abstain for reasons other than religion); Alliance Brief supra note 26, at
*20 ("Plaintiffs are entitled to equal laws, not equal results.") (internal quotation marks omitted);
see also Freedom From Religion Found. v. Hanover Sch. Dist., 626 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2010)
(dismissing plaintiffs' equal protection claim, reasoning New Hampshire Pledge Statute applied
equally to all students).
32 Oral Argument, supra note 20, at 24:32.
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God-believing peers, by disaffirming the very trait that characterizes
atheists and non-believers as a class: disbelief in God.33
Furthermore, the plaintiffs argued that religion, being among the
classifications specified in the ERA, the SJC must apply strict scrutiny.3 4 It
is well established that the classifications enumerated in Article 106 of the
Massachusetts Constitution are subject to the strictest judicial scrutiny.3 5 In
their complaint, the plaintiffs stressed that although there might be a
legitimate governmental interest in instilling values of patriotism and good
citizenship through a daily recitation of the Pledge, "there is no rational
basis, let alone compelling reason, for inclusion of the discriminatory term
'under God' in such recitation. 3 6 The defendants, on the other hand,
stressed that the Doe children were not classified or treated differently than
any other students, and insisted that the plaintiffs' Equal Protection claim
should therefore fail.37 However, the defendants argued that even if the
court found that the Pledge statute created a classification, it should only
apply rational basis scrutiny, because the Pledge statute-both written and
implied-does not create a suspect classification so as to warrant the
application of strict scrutiny.38 Even assuming there was a classification,

33 See Plaintiffs'Reply, supra note 19, at *2 (citing Iowa and Massachusetts highest courts'
reasoning in legalizing same-sex marriage); see also Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 885
(Iowa 2009) ("[A] gay or lesbian person can only gain the same rights under the statute as a
heterosexual person by negating the very trait that defines gay and lesbian people as a class
their sexual orientation."); Goodridge,798 N.E.2d at 952-53 (finding statute classified on basis of
sexual orientation even though it was facially neutral).
34 See Plaintijfs' Brief supra note 17, at *12 (rejecting Superior Court's application of mere
rational basis scrutiny); see also MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. 1, as amendedby MASS. CONST. amend.
art. 106 ("All people are born free and equal and have certain natural, essential and unalienable
rights ...
Equality under the law shall not be denied or abridged because of sex, race, color, creed,
or national origin.").
35 See Finch v. Commonwealth Health Ins. Connector, 946 N.E.2d 1262, 1268-69 (Mass.
2011) (asserting Article 106 mandates strict scrutiny of enumerated classifications); Goodridge,
798 N.E.2d at 960 (highlighting strict scrutiny as appropriate standard of review where statute
uses suspect classification); Lowell v. Kowalski, 405 N.E.2d 135, 139 (Mass. 1980) (applying
strict scrutiny for gender classification, as required under ERA); Commonwealth v. King, 372
N.E.2d 196, 206 (Mass. 1977) (reasoning all enumerated classifications are subject to strictest
judicial scrutiny); see also Plaintiffs' Brief supra note 17, at *15-16 (noting purpose of Article
106 was to guarantee courts applied strict scrutiny for enumerated classifications).
36 Complaint, supra note 17, at 7 (noting government interest was achieved before "under
God" was added to Pledge in 1954).
37 See Defendants' Brief supra note 26, at *14-18 ("[Ilt is undisputed that all public school
students (whether they be Christian, Jewish, Muslim, Hindu or Atheist) in the School Districts
may participate or not participate in the Pledge of Allegiance on any given day for any or no
reason.").
38 See Defendants' Brief supra note 26, at *27-29 ("[T]he only possible distinction in this
dispute is between students who want to say the Pledge ...and those who do not, which is not a
distinction based on a suspect classification."). However, the defendants maintained that section
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defendants maintained that the Pledge statute nonetheless satisfies strict
scrutiny, because the voluntariness of the act make it the least
discriminatory method possible of frithering the government's compelling
interest in promoting patriotism and loyalty.39
The Superior Court followed the defendants' argument and applied
rational basis scrutiny. 40 The court reasoned that the daily recitation of the
Pledge is a patriotic exercise, and inclusion of the phrase "under God" in

the Pledge does not convert it to a religious exercise. 41
Ultimately, the SJC rejected the plaintiffs' argument and upheld
the Superior Court's decision.42 In its decision, the SJC noted that there
was some indication in the legislative history that the purpose behind
amending the language of the Pledge to include the phrase "under God"
was non-secular. 43 Nonetheless, it reasoned that "[a]lthough the words
'under God' undeniably have a religious tinge, courts that have considered
the history of the pledge and the presence of those words have consistently
concluded that the pledge, notwithstanding its reference to God, is a

fundamentally patriotic exercise, not a religious one. ",44
The SJC found the plaintiffs' reliance on Finch misguided. 45 It

sixty-nine would satisfy even strict scrutiny, as it would be difficult, if not impossible to more
narrowly tailor a law that is already completely voluntary. See id.at *34-35. But see Plaintiffs'
Brief supra note 17, at *36 (arguing practice not narrowly tailored to compelling government
interest of instilling patriotism and loyalty). The plaintiffs insisted that, "assuming, therefore, that
the government has a compelling interest in instilling attitudes of 'patriotism and loyalty,' the
means chosen to achieve those ends specifically, a daily exercise affirming a central religious
belief that favors some students over others is not narrowly tailored to avoid discrimination in
achieving such ends." Id. at *35-36 (describing multiple alternative means of instilling patriotism
and loyalty).
39 Oral Argument, supra note 20, at 27:55.
40 See Doe v. Acton-Boxborough Reg'l Sch. Dist., No. MICV2010-04261, slip op. at 19-20
(Mass. Super. Ct. June 5, 2012) (rejecting plaintiffs' argument and refusing to apply strict
scrutiny). The Superior Court reasoned that the Pledge statute did not classify students on the
basis of religion simply as a result of their non-participation because students may choose not to
participate for any or no reason at all. See id.at 19 (citing Freedom From Religion Foundation);
see also Freedom From Religion Found. v. Hanover Sch. Dist., 626 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2010)
(providing basis for Superior Court's decision).
41 See Doe, slip op. at 19 (applying strict scrutiny only when statute infringes
upon
fundamental right or involves suspect class); see also Newdow v. Rio Linda Union Sch. Dist.,
597 F.3d 1007, 1038 (9th Cir. 2010) (classifying Pledge as patriotic exercise rather than prayer or
religious exercise). But see Newdow, 597 F.3d at 1038 ("We agree that the students in elementary
schools are being coerced to listen to the other students recite the Pledge. They may even feel
induced to recite the Pledge themselves.").
42 See Doe v. Acton-Boxborough Reg'l Sch. Dist., 8 N.E.3d 737, 752 (Mass. 2014) (holding
daily recitation of Pledge does not violate Massachusetts Constitution).
43 See id.
at 743 (recognizing Pledge was amended during escalation of Cold War).
44 Id.at 744.
45 See id. at 746 (noting Finch reaffirmed article 106 classifications subjected to strict
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reasoned that "the flaw in the argument ... is that there is no classification,
let alone a suspect classification based on religion, created by the practice46
of reciting the pledge in the manner it is presently recited, voluntarily.,
The SJC's finding hinged on the voluntary nature of the daily recitation of
the Pledge, reasoning that any child can abstain from reciting all or part of
the Pledge for any reason, religious or otherwise.4 7
Although the SJC's equal protection inquiry could have ended
there, the court further discredited the legitimacy of the plaintiffs' alleged
injury. 48 Although the plaintiffs insisted that their children's decision not
to recite the Pledge may lead to potential bullying, the SIC emphasized that
there was no evidence indicating that the plaintiffs' children, or any other
children in Massachusetts, were in fact bullied as a result of their decision
to abstain from reciting the Pledge. 49 As such, the SIC held "that this very
limited type of consequence alleged by the plaintiffs-feeling stigmatized
and excluded-is not cognizable under art. 106. "5o Ironically, the SIC
criticized the plaintiffs' strategic advocacy choice to limit their
constitutional claim to the Equal Rights Amendment, and cautioned against

scrutiny). The SJC explained that "if the practice of reciting the pledge did in fact single out the
plaintiffs and treat them differently from others in any legally cognizable way (in other words,

create a 'classification') because

of their religious beliefs, their argument might be

commendable." Id.
46 Id. (rejecting plaintiffs' argument that Pledge should be subject to strict scrutiny). The
SJC asserted that all students are treated alike, and that there is no discriminatory classification
based on religion because the practice is entirely voluntary. See id. at 747 ("[S]ignificantly, no
student who abstains from reciting the pledge, or any part of it, is required to articulate a reason
for his or her choice to do so.").
47 See Doe, 8 N.E.3d at 747-49 ("[Olne student's choice not to participate because of a
religiously held belief is ... indistinguishable from another's choice to abstain for a wholly
different, more mundane, and constitutionally insignificant reason.").
48 See id. at 749 (emphasizing plaintiffs' children were not treated or perceived any
differently because of religious beliefs).
49 See id. (describing circumstances of plaintiffs' alleged injury).
[Plaintiffs] contend that the mere recitation of the pledge in the schools is itself a
public repudiation of their religious values and, in essence, a public announcement that
they do not belong. It is this alleged repudiation that they say causes them to feel
marginalized, sending a message to them and to others that, because they do not share
all of the values that are being recited, they are unpatriotic outsiders.
Id. (labeling plaintiffs' claim of stigma as "more esoteric" and therefore not cognizable) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
50 Id. (rejecting plaintiffs' equal protection argument).
The SJC reiterated that where a
program or activity is entirely voluntary, any feeling of "stigma" caused by seeing or hearing
others participate is not cognizable for purposes of equal protection. Id. at 750-51 ("The fact that
a school ... operates a voluntary program or offers an activity that offends the religious beliefs of
one or more individuals, and leaves them feeling 'stigmatized' or 'excluded' as a result, does not
mean that the program or activity necessarily violates equal protection principles.").
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using equal protection as a fallback constitutional claim. 5'
Most notably, Justice Lenk wrote separately to express her view
that the inclusion of the words "under God" in the Pledge "creates a
classification that is potentially cognizable under the equal rights
amendment of the Massachusetts Constitution., 52 Justice Lenk reasoned
that the phrase "under God," by its very nature, has a religious connotation
that cannot be diminished merely by the fact that the daily exercise is
voluntary. 53 As such, she cautioned that the court's holding should not be
construed as a bar on any and all like claims, and avowed that "should
future plaintiffs demonstrate that the distinction created by the pledge as
currently written has engendered bullying or differential treatment, [she]
would leave open 54
the possibility that the equal rights amendment might

provide a remedy.,

III. THE STALEMATE BETWEEN THE PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE
AND THE CONSTITUTION
A. The History of the Pledge & Its Challengers
In 1954, during the height of the Cold War and in an attempt to
distinguish America from "atheistic" communism and the Soviet Union,
Congress amended the language of the Pledge of Allegiance to read: "I
pledge allegiance to the flag of the United States of America, and to the
Republic for which it stands, one Nation, under God, indivisible, with
liberty and justice for all."55 The Knights of Columbus, a Catholic fraternal

51 See id.at 751 ("Where the plaintiffs do not claim that a school program or activity violates

anyone's First Amendment [rights] ...
they cannot rely instead on the equal rights amendment,
and claim that the school's even-handed implementation ...and the plaintiffs' exposure to it,
unlawfully discriminates against them on the basis of religion.") (internal emphasis omitted).
12 Doe, 8 N.E.3d at 752 (Lenk, J., concurring) (noting Pledge creates potentially cognizable
classification, although not in present case).
53 See id.(finding existence of suspect classification notwithstanding Pledge's voluntariness).
Justice Lenk asserted that the fact that recitation was voluntary, in no way lessened the clear nonsecular implication of the words "under God." See id.("A reference to a supreme being, by its
very nature, distinguishes between those who believe such a being exists and those whose beliefs
are otherwise. This distinction creates a classification, one that is based on religion.").
14 Id. at 752-53.
55 See Act of June 14, 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-396, 68 Stat. 249 (1954) (codified at 4 U.S.C. § 4
(2000)) (adding phrase "under God" to Pledge of Allegiance); H.R. REP. No. 83-1693 (1954),
reprintedin 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2339, 2340 ("The inclusion of God in our pledge therefore would
further acknowledge the dependence of our people and our Government upon the moral directions
of the Creator. At the same time it would serve to deny the atheistic and materialistic concepts of
communism."); see also Steven B. Epstein, Rethinking the Constitutionality of Ceremonial
Deism, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 2083, 2118-21 (1996) (stating "under God" added to recognize God
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organization, played an integral role in altering the Pledge.56 Even before
the phrase "under God" was added to the Pledge, litigants challenged its
constitutionality.5 7
Since 1954, many litigants have challenged the
constitutionality of the Pledge as a violation of the Establishment Clause,
but the Supreme Court has never ruled on the issue. 58 Ultimately, lower

courts have been left to decide this issue for themselves; however
notwithstanding the lack of guidance, these courts have remained fairly
consistent in 59holding that the Pledge does not violate the United States
Constitution.

as definitive factor in American way of life); Bill W. Sanford, Jr.,
Separation v. Patriotism:
Expelling the Pledge from School, 34 ST. MARY'S L.J. 461, 464-65 (2003) (detailing principles,

history, and reasoning behind Pledge); Thompson, supra note 2, at 564 (describing history of
Pledge of Allegiance). The Pledge of Allegiance, as written by a socialist Baptist minister in
1892, did not include the words "under God" until 1954. See Thompson, supra note 2, at 564.
56 See Collins, supra note 16, at 16 (providing history of Knights of Columbus's involvement
in adding "under God" to Pledge). The Knights of Columbus is a Catholic-based fraternal benefit
organization.
Our
Principles,
KNIGHTS
OF
COLUMBUS,
http://www.kofc.org/un/en/about/principles/index.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2014). One of the
organization's core principals is patriotism. Id.("Members of the Knights of Columbus ...
are
patriotic citizens. We are proud of our devotion to God and country, and believe in standing up
for both. Whether it's in public or private, the Knights remind the world that Catholics support
their nations and are amongst the greatest citizens."); see Collins, supra note 16, at 16 (discussing
history of Knights of Columbus and organization's values). Collins explained that, "out of their
patriotism and as a showing against communism, the Knights of Columbus began adding the
phrase 'under God' [to the] Pledge in their ceremonies." Collins, supra note 16, at 16. In 1952,
the Knights of Columbus began its crusade to amend the language of the Pledge, and in 1954,
President Eisenhower signed a bill into law that officially added the phrase "under God" to the
Pledge. See id.at 16-17 (arguing legislative history of Pledge indicates religion as basis for
change).
57 See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641-42 (1943) (holding
regulations requiring students to recite Pledge violated First and Fourteenth Amendments). The
Supreme Court's holding in Barnette ultimately established the standard that students could not
be compelled to recite the Pledge of Allegiance in school, thus implying that any recitation must
be voluntary. See id.at 642; Tara P. Beglin Note, "One Nation Under God, "Indeed: The Ninth
Circuit's Problematic Decision to Change our Pledge of Allegiance, 20 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL
COMMENT. 129, 137-38 (2005) (discussing Supreme Court's decision in Barnette).
58 See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 17 (2004) (avoiding

deciding
whether Ninth Circuit erred in holding phrase "under God" violated Establishment Clause); see
also U.S. CONST. amend. I (prohibiting making of any law respecting establishment of religion or
infringing freedom of religion). However, the Supreme Court has decided a number of other
cases that have addressed the constitutionality of various other government actions respecting
religion. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 307-08 (2000) (holding
student-led, student-initiated prayer before football games impermissibly coercive and violated
Establishment Clause); Lee v. Weisman 505 U.S. 577, 581-83 (1992) (finding invocation by
rabbi at middle school graduation unconstitutional); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 582-83
(1987) (striking down law promoting teaching of creationism); Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 223-25 (1963) (holding statutes and policies requiring reading of Bible in public
schools violated Establishment Clause).
59 See, e.g., Freedom from Religion Found. v. Hanover Sch. Dist., 626 F.3d 1, 6-15 (1st Cir.
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Litigants have rarely brought challenges to government expressions
of religion under the Equal Protection Clause, and when they do, it usually
constitutes an unimportant and unaddressed secondary claim.60 Only two
cases have ever specifically addressed whether the Pledge violates the
Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. 61 In both
Freedomfrom Religion and Sherman, the courts were able to gloss over the
Equal Protection issue because it was used as a secondary claim.62 Instead,
litigants have relied on the Establishment Clause, but this reliance has
proven inadequate and arguably inappropriate, particularly for those
challenging the Pledge.63
Despite the Court's decision in Barnette, children have been
continuously punished for refusing to recite the Pledge in school.64

2010) (holding Pledge does not violate Establishment, Free Exercise, Due Process, or Equal
Protection Clauses); Myers v. Loudoun Cnty. Pub. Sch., 418 F.3d 395, 397 (4th Cir. 2005)
(asserting Pledge is patriotic activity and statement of loyalty to flag, not religious exercise);
Palmerv. Bd. of Educ., 603 F.2d 1271, 1274 (7th Cir. 1979) (holding teacher not free to disregard
school's policy requiring teachers lead daily recitation of Pledge); Circle Sch. v. Phillips, 270 F.
Supp. 2d 616, 621-22 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (reasoning statute did not violate Barnette because it
included opt-out provision); Shermanv. Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist. 21, 758 F. Supp. 1244, 125152 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (holding Illinois Pledge statute constitutional under First and Fourteenth
Amendments), aff'd in part, rev 'd in part on other grounds, 980 F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 1992). Both
Freedom from Religion and Sherman specifically held that the Pledge did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause. See Freedomfrom Religion, 626 F.3d at 14 (reasoning New Hampshire statute
did not provide different treatment of any class based on religion); Sherman, 758 F. Supp. at 1251
(holding Illinois statute rationally related to legitimate state interest in adhering to "suitable
curriculum").
60 See Gellman & Looper-Friedman supra note 3, at 666 ("[T]he First Amendment clauses
are less effective when the problem is neither interference nor true coercion, but unequal
treatment."). Gellman and Looper-Friedman asserted that reliance on the Establishment Clause is
a mistake because its analysis focuses on coercion, religious purpose, or entanglement of
government and religion, rather than on equality. See id.
at 672.
61 See Freedom from Religion, 626 F.3d at 14 (reasoning New Hampshire statute applies
equally to God-believers and nonbelievers giving people right to opt-out); Sherman, 758 F. Supp.
at 1251 (failing to apply strict scrutiny because no fundamental right or suspect classification
involved).
62 See Freedom from Religion, 626 F.3d at 14 (addressing Equal Protection claim in one
paragraph of its fifteen-page decision); Sherman, 758 F. Supp. at 1251 (addressing Equal
Protection claim at end of decision in less than one half page).
63 See Gellman & Looper-Friedman, supra note 3, at 702-04 (arguing "Equal Protection [i]s
a [b]etter [flit [w]here the [p]roblem is [mIarginalization"). The inclusion of the phrase "under
God" in the Pledge is rooted in separatism, making it better suited for the Equal Protection
Clause. See id.at 703-04.
64 See Lori A. Catalano, Comment, Totalitarianismin Public Schools: Enforcing a Religious
and PoliticalOrthodoxy, 34 CAP. U. L. REv. 601, 609-10 (2006) (describing recent incidents of
teachers punishing students for refusing to recite Pledge); see also W. Va. State Bd. of Ed. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641-42 (1943) (establishing standard that students could not be
compelled to recite Pledge). For example, in recent years a thirteen-year-old Jehovah's Witness
in Washington was forced to stand outside in the rain for refusing to recite the Pledge in school,
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Incidents such as these illustrate the unequal treatment of a class of
students because of their religion, and therefore demonstrate the
appropriateness of the Equal Protection Clause for challenges to the
Pledge .65

B. Equal Protection
Equal Protection is rooted in the notion that the states must treat
those who are similarly situated alike.66 "All equal protection issues pose
the same basic question: Is the government's classification justified by a
sufficient purpose?", 67 More specifically, all equal protection claims are
subject to a three-prong analysi S.68
Determining how the government is drawing a distinction between
people is the fundamental first step to any equal protection analysis.69 The
while a sixteen-year-old atheist student in California was given detention for failing to recite the
Pledge. Catalano, supra, at 610; see Brad K. Brown, The Pledge Not Taken, S.F. CHRON., June
29, 1998, at A3 (reporting incident of atheist student given detention); Dionne Searcey, Student
May Sue District Over Pledge, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 10, 1998, at BI (reporting story of
Jehovah's Witness forced to stand in rain by teacher). Even more striking, when "a high school
senior in Alabama refused to recite the Pledge ... the school gave him the choice of receiving
detention (and not graduating) or being paddled." Catalano, supra, at 610; see Holloman v.
Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1261 (11th Cir. 2004) (describing details of Alabama teen's
punishment).
65 See Gellman & Looper-Friedman, supra note 3, at 702-04 (asserting appropriateness
of
Equal Protection Clause for religious expressions by governments).
66 See Giovanna Shay, Similarly Situated, 18 GEO. MASON L. REv. 581, 587 (2011)
(discussing concept of "similarly situated"). In her examination of the concept of "similarly
situated," Shay notes that many opinions repeat similar language in emphasizing that the
Constitution requires states to treat those similarly situated alike, but that it does not require
things that are different "to be treated in law as though they were the same." Id. However, the
concept of "separate but equal" has long been discredited as a justification for disparate treatment.
See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 8 (1967) (rejecting argument that equal application of
law satisfies Fourteenth Amendment); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964)
("Judicial inquiry under the Equal Protection Clause, therefore, does not end with a showing of
equal application among the members of the class defined by the legislation."); Brown v. Bd. of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (finding separate educational facilities based on race inherently
unequal).
67 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES

669 (3d ed.

2006).
See id. at 670 (asserting "all equal protection issues can be broken down into three
questions"). Chemerinsky identifies the three major questions that make up any equal protection
analysis: "What is the classification? What level of scrutiny should be applied? Does the
particular government action meet the level of scrutiny?" Id.
69 See id. at 670 (emphasizing equal protection analysis must always begin with determining
government's classification). "There are two basic ways of establishing a classification. One is
where the classification exists on the face of the law, that is, where the law in its very terms draws
a distinction among people ... Alternatively, sometimes laws are facially neutral, but there is a
discriminatory impact." Id. When a law is neutral on its face, the Supreme Court has required its
68
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Supreme Court has firmly established that the type of classification
determines the appropriate level of scrutiny. 70
Laws implicating a
fundamental right or "suspect" class are subject to heightened judicial
71
scrutiny, while all others must satisfy at least rational basis scrutiny.
Although the standard for equal protection analysis under both the
Massachusetts Constitution and the Federal Constitution is identical, the
72
protections afforded by the two are not.

There are

notable

differences

between the

United

States

Constitution and the Massachusetts Constitution. 73 Under the United States
Constitution, people are afforded equal protection of the laws, but the
Massachusetts Constitution goes further by declaring that everyone is

challengers to prove both a discriminatory impact and a discriminatory purpose for their equal
protection claim to stand. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987) (noting
claimant has burden of proving existence of legislative discriminatory purpose); Personnel Adm'r
of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273-74 (1979) ("[Discriminatory] impact provides an
important starting point, but purposeful discrimination is the condition that offends the
Constitution.") (internal quotation marks omitted); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239
(1976) (asserting law is not unconstitutional solely because of racially disproportionate impact
absent discriminatory purpose); Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224-26 (1971) (stressing
discriminatory purpose alone is not sufficient and requiring proof of discriminatory impact). But
see Goodridge v. Dep't. of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 971-972 (Mass. 2003) (Greaney, J.,
concurring) (arguing lack of discriminatory purpose does not mitigate a law's present
discriminatory impact).
70 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 67, at 671 (noting different levels of scrutiny are applied
depending on type of classification).
71 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1268-69
(2007) (discussing history and modem application of strict scrutiny). The Supreme Court has
firmly established that under the Fourteenth Amendment, classifications based on race or national
origin, or those implicating a fundamental right, are subject to strict scrutiny. See CHEMERNSKY,
supra note 67, at 671 (discussing different levels of judicial scrutiny). However, state courts,
such as the SJC, have applied strict scrutiny to other classifications where the Equal Rights
Amendment to their state's constitution specifically enumerates certain suspect classifications.
See Finch v. Commonwealth Health Ins. Connector Auth., 946 N.E.2d 1262, 1268-69 (Mass.
2011) (asserting Article 106 mandates strict scrutiny of enumerated classifications);
Commonwealth v. King, 372 N.E.2d 196, 206 (Mass. 1977) (reasoning all enumerated
classifications are subject to strictest judicial scrutiny).
72 See Brackett v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 850 N.E.2d 533, 545 (Mass. 2006) (noting equal
protection analysis under Massachusetts Constitution is same as that under Federal Constitution);
Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 948-49 ("The Massachusetts Constitution is, if anything, more
protective of individual liberty and equality than the Federal Constitution.").
73 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No state shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."); MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. 1, as amended by
MASS. CONST. amend, art. 106 ("All people are born free and equal and have certain natural,
essential and unalienable rights ... Equality under the law shall not be denied or abridged because
of sex, race, color, creed, or national origin.").
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equal. 74 Furthermore, the Massachusetts Constitution, unlike the Federal
Constitution, specifically enumerates certain "suspect" classifications that
are to be subject to strict scrutiny.75 Among these specifically enumerated
suspect classes are classifications based on creed, or religion.7 6 Therefore,
under the Massachusetts Constitution, any religious 77classification by the
government is subject to the strictest judicial scrutiny.

Twenty-one states, including Massachusetts, have some form of an
Equal Rights Amendment to their state constitutions. 78

Some of these

74 See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 948 ("The Massachusetts Constitution affirms the dignity
and equality of all individuals. It forbids the creation of second-class citizens.").
75 Compare U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No state shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."), with MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. I,
as amended by MASS. CONST. amend, art. CVI ("All people are born free and equal and have
certain natural, essential and unalienable rights ... Equality under the law shall not be denied or
abridged because of sex, race, color, creed, or national origin.").
76 MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. I, amended by MASS. CONST. amend, art. CVI ("Equality under

the law shall not be denied or abridged because of sex, race, color, creed, or national origin.").
77 See sources cited supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text (discussing SJC's application
of strict scrutiny to classifications enumerated in Article 106).
78 ARK. CONST. art. II, § 3 ("The equality of all persons before the law is recognized, and
shall ever remain inviolate; nor shall any citizen ever be deprived of any right, privilege or
immunity; nor exempted from any burden or duty, on account of race, color or previous
condition."); CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7 ("A person may not be ... denied equal protection of the
laws .... A citizen or class of citizens may not be granted privileges or immunities not granted on
the same terms to all citizens."); COLO. CONST. art. II, § 29 ("Equality of rights under the law
shall not be denied or abridged by the state of Colorado or any of its political subdivisions on
account of sex."); CONN. CONST. art. I, § 20 ("No person shall be denied the equal protection of
the law nor be subjected to segregation or discrimination in the exercise or enjoyment of his or
her civil or political rights because of religion, race, color, ancestry, national origin, sex or
physical or mental disability."); FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2 ("All natural persons, female and male
alike, are equal before the law and have inalienable rights .... No person shall be deprived of any
right because of race, religion, national origin, or physical disability."); HAW. CONST. art. I, § 5
("No person shall be ... denied the equal protection of the laws, nor be denied the enjoyment of
the person's civil rights or be discriminated against in the exercise thereof because of race,
religion, sex or ancestry."); ILL. CONST. art. I, § 2 ("No person shall be ... denied the equal
protection of the laws."); IOWA CONST. art. I, § 6 ("All laws of a general nature shall have a
uniform operation; the general assembly shall not grant to any citizen, or class of citizens,
privileges or immunities, which, upon the same terms shall not equally belong to all citizens.");
LA. CONST. art. I, § 3 ("No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws. No law shall
discriminate against a person because of race or religious ideas, beliefs, or affiliations. No law
shall arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably discriminate against a person because of birth, age,
sex, culture, physical condition or political ideas or affiliations."); MD. CONST. DECLARATION
OF RIGHTS art. XLVI ("Equality of rights under the law shall not be abridged or denied because
of sex."); MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. I, amended by MASS. CONST. amend, art. CVI ("All people are
born free and equal and have certain natural, essential and unalienable rights .... Equality under
the law shall not be denied or abridged because of sex, race, color, creed, or national origin.");
MONT. CONST. art. II, § 4 ("The dignity of the human being is inviolable. No person shall be
denied the equal protection of the laws. Neither the state nor any person, firm, corporation, or
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states have shown a willingness to broaden the rights afforded to their

citizens under their state's constitution. 79 Notably, these Equal Rights
Amendments have been employed in same-sex marriage cases and six
states have judicially legalized same-sex marriage. 0 Although each of
these six high courts approached the issue differently, each held that
prohibiting same-sex marriage violated the protections afforded to their
citizens under their constitutions' Equal Rights Amendments."'

institution shall discriminate against any person in the exercise of his civil or political rights on
account of race, color, sex, culture, social origin or condition, or political or religious ideas.");
N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. II ("Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by this
state on account of race, creed, color, sex or national origin."); N.J. CONST. art. I, § 5 ("No person
shall be denied the enjoyment of any civil or military right, nor be discriminated against in the
exercise of any civil or military right, nor be segregated in the militia or in the public schools,
because of religious principles, race, color, ancestry or national origin."); N.M. CONST. art. II, §
18 ("No person shall be ... denied equal protection of the laws."); PA. CONST. art. I, § 26
("Neither the Commonwealth nor any political subdivision thereof shall deny to any person the
enjoyment of any civil right, nor discriminate against any person in the exercise of any civil
right."); TEx. CONST. art. I, § 3a ("Equality under the law shall not be denied or abridged because
of sex, race, color, creed, or national origin."); UTAH CONST. art. I, § 24 ("All laws of a general
nature shall have uniform operation."); VA. CONST. art. I, § 4 ("That no man, or set of men, is
entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community."); WASH. CONST.
art. I, § 12 ("No law shall be passed granting to any citizen, class of citizens, or corporation other
than municipal, privileges or immunities which upon the same terms shall not equally belong to
all citizens, or corporations."); WYO. CONST. art. I, § 3 ("Since equality in the enjoyment of
natural and civil rights is only made sure through political equality, the laws of this state affecting
the political rights and privileges of its citizens shall be without distinction of race, color, sex, or
any circumstance or condition whatsoever other than individual incompetency, or unworthiness
duly ascertained by a court of competent jurisdiction."); see ILL. CONST. art. I, § 20 ("To promote
individual dignity, communications that portray criminality, depravity or lack of virtue in, or that
incite violence, hatred, abuse or hostility toward, a person or group of persons by reason of or by
reference to religious, racial ethnic, national or regional affiliation are condemned.").
79 See Jeffrey A. Parness, American State ConstitutionalEqualities, 45 GONz. L. REv. 773,
774-776 (2009-2010) (noting state constitutions often contain specific affinnative rights); see,
e.g., Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 420 (Conn. 2008) (recognizing certain
instances in which Connecticut Constitution provides greater protection than Federal
Constitution); Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 948-49 ("The Massachusetts Constitution is, if anything,
more protective of individual liberty and equality than the Federal Constitution; it may demand
broader protection for fundamental rights."); Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Evolution of Equality in
State ConstitutionalLaw, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 1013, 1029-30 (2003) ("[S]ome state supreme courts
have afforded their state equality guarantees a wider scope than the Federal Equal Protection
Clause in order to protect rights beyond those recognized in the federal arena.").
80 See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 453 (Cal. 2008), superseded by constitutional
amendment, CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5 (invalidatedby Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d
921 (N.D. Cal. 2010)); Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 482; Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 906-07
(Iowa 2009); Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 969-70; Garden State Equality v. Dow, 82 A.3d 336, 369
(N.J. Super. Ct. 2013); Griego v. Oliver, 316 P.3d 865, 888 (N.M. 2013).
81 Compare Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 961 (concluding same-sex marriage ban does not even
survive rational basis review), and In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 401 (finding sexual
orientation a constitutionally suspect classification and applying strict scrutiny), with Griego, 316
P.3d at 884 (reasoning classification based on sexual orientation requires intermediate scrutiny),
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IV. THE FUTURE OF THE PLEDGE

The inclusion of the words "under God" in the Pledge was
undeniably rooted in religion.8 2 In turn, the statutorily mandated daily
recitation of the Pledge by all students in public schools across the
Commonwealth is a violation of Article 106 of the Massachusetts
Constitution.8 3 Because the Pledge statute mandates the daily recitation of
the Pledge, the language of the Pledge, in turn, becomes part of the
statute.84 A strong argument can be made that the language "under God" in
and of itself creates a classification between God-believers and
nonbelievers.8 5 However, even if the statute
is deemed facially neutral,
86
impact.
discriminatory
a
exists
there still
Given that religion is one of the suspect classes specifically
enumerated in Article 106, any religious classification must be subject to

and Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 883 ("[E]qual protection before the law demands more than the
equal application of the classifications made by the law. The law itself must be equal."), and
Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 430-32 (recognizing sexual orientation as quasi-suspect classification).
But see Garden State, 82 A.3d at 361-62 (noting differences between equal protection analysis
under New Jersey Constitution and Federal Constitution). In Greigo, the Supreme Court of New
Mexico concluded that, "intermediate scrutiny must be applied in this case because the LGBT
community is a discrete group that has been subjected to a history of purposeful discrimination,
and it has not had sufficient political strength to protect itself from such discrimination." Griego,
316 P.3d at 884 (holding law denying same-sex couples right to marry does not survive
intermediate scrutiny); accord Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 895-96 (considering traditional factors
established by Supreme Court and applying intermediate scrutiny); Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 432
("Gay persons have been subjected to and stigmatized by a long history of purposeful and
invidious discrimination that continues to manifest itself ...[L]aws singling them out for
disparate treatment are subject to heightened judicial scrutiny to ensure [they] are not the product
of such historical prejudice and stereotyping.").
82 See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text (detailing purpose of adding "under God" to
language of Pledge).
83 Cf supra notes 17, 19, and 21 and accompanying text (arguing stigmatization of
nonbelievers creates classification based on religion); supra note 71 and accompanying text
(noting application of strict scrutiny when ERA specifically enumerates suspect classifications).
Prior to the 1954 amendment, the recitation of the Pledge continued to instill values of patriotism
and good citizenship, demonstrating that this compelling government interest could be achieved
without the inclusion of the words "under God." See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text
(summarizing history of Pledge prior to 1954 amendment).
84 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 71, § 69 (2012) (providing for daily recitation of the Pledge in
all public schools).
85 See supra notes 17, 19, and 21 and accompanying text (arguing stigmatization of
nonbelievers creates classification).
86 See supra notes 17, 19, 21-23, and 33 and accompanying text (detailing basis of plaintiffs'
equal protection claim); see also Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 971-72
(2003) (Greaney, J., concurring) (noting Massachusetts ERA does not have "discriminatory
intent" requirement).
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strict scrutiny. 87 Surely, recitation of the pre-1954 Pledge adequately
promoted and instilled values of patriotism and good citizenship without
the words "under God."88 This compelling government interest was readily
achieved by far less discriminatory means." Therefore, inclusion of the
phrase "under God" is not necessary to further the compelling government
interest in instilling values of patriotism and good citizenship among school
children.90
Although the SJC found in favor of the defendants, the plaintiffs in
Doe may have still gotten what they wanted; they got the SJC to discuss
this issue in depth and not simply gloss over it as other courts have done. 91
Although the plaintiffs had a viable claim, they ultimately
failed to execute
92
argument.
their
of
points
strongest
the
and emphasize
Likely the biggest hurdle a litigator will face is establishing the
existence of a classification in their state's Pledge Statute, although Justice
Lenk provides persuasive support for the existence of such. 93 Arguably,
one of the strongest arguments in favor of challengers is Congress' clear
non-secular purpose in inserting the phrase "under God" into the Pledge.9 4
This phrase was added to the Pledge to distinguish "us"-God-believing
America-from "them"-atheist Communist Russia. 95
The message
implying that one cannot be a "true American" and be an atheist at the
96
same time.
Another argument that the plaintiffs made, but failed to fully
execute is that the issue of voluntariness has no place in equal protection

87 See

supra note 71 and accompanying text (noting application of strict scrutiny when ERA

specifically enumerates suspect classifications).
88See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text (examining history of Pledge).
89 Cf supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text (discussing how language of Pledge was

amended to include words "under God").
90 Cf supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text (summarizing history of Pledge prior to
1954 amendment).

91See cases cited supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text (discussing holdings inFreedom
from Religion and Sherman).
92

See supra notes 17-24, 33-34, and 36 and accompanying text (detailing plaintiffs'

arguments).

93 See Doe v. Acton-Boxborough Reg'l Sch. Dist., 8 N.E.3d 737, 752 (Mass. 2014) (Lenk, J.,
concurring) (arguing "under God" distinguishes between theists and nontheists thereby
classifying students based on religion).
94 See supra note 55 and accompanying text (addressing history of Pledge and Congress'
purpose in adding phrase "under God").
95 See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text (setting forth history of Pledge and Knights
of Columbus's involvement in its amendment).
96 See supra note 55 and accompanying text (noting how inclusion of "under God" had non-

secular purpose).
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analysis.97 Many courts have brushed off any claim that the Pledge is
unconstitutional on the basis of the Supreme Court's holding in Barnette
that its recitation must be voluntary. 98 However, the conclusion that a
statutorily mandated daily recitation of the Pledge does not violate equal
99
protection solely because such recitation is voluntary is without merit.
Even Justice Lenk questioned the validity of any argument that the Pledge

statute did not offend the Massachusetts Constitution because recitation is
voluntary. 100 Although the plaintiffs asserted that voluntariness in no way
neutralizes the discriminatory impact, they failed to use this argument to

their advantage. 1
The plaintiffs also failed to adequately attack the validity of the
defense's assertion that the Pledge statute did not violate the Equal Rights
Amendment because it applied equally to all public school students across
the Commonwealth. 0 2 The plaintiffs rebutted this assertion by reasoning
that an atheist student could only gain the same benefit as his or her Godbelieving peers, by disaffirming the very trait that characterizes atheists and
non-believers as a class: disbelief in God.0 3 Although the plaintiffs' made
a compelling argument, they failed to take advantage of the landmark
decisions that effectively destroyed any validity of the notion that mere
equal application of the law satisfies an equal protection inquiry.
97 See Plaintiffs' Reply, supra note 19, at *8 (emphasizing while voluntariness is central
to
First Amendment analysis, it is irrelevant for Equal Protection).
98 See supra note 57 and accompanying text (discussing Barnette decision and its

implications); cases cited supra note 59 and accompanying text (citing cases post-Barnette that
have addressed Pledge's constitutionality).
99 See Inquiry Brief supra note 23, at *9-10 ("It is impermissible for the State to condition
the benefit of participation in a public school group activity on a pupil's renunciation of her
religious beliefs, even when participation in the activity is voluntary.").
100 See Doe v. Acton-Boxborough Reg'l Sch. Dist., 8 N.E.3d 737, 752 (Mass. 2014) (Lenk,
J., concurring) ("[T]he logical implication of the phrase 'under God' is not diminished simply
because children need not say those words aloud."); Oral Argument, supra note 20, at 26:29
(showing Justice Lenk questioning validity of "voluntariness" argument). When defense counsel
argued that there was no equal protection violation because recitation was voluntary, Justice Lenk
quickly asserted "voluntariness has nothing to with equal protection analysis, does it?" See Oral
Argument, supra note 20, at 26:30.
101 See supra notes 23 and 33 (recognizing atheist student can only gain same benefit of
participation by disaffirming his/her fundamental beliefs); see also supra note 27 (addressing
defendants' argument that right to opt-out does not create religious classification).
102 See sources cited supra note 31 and accompanying text (discussing defendants' "equal
application" argument).
Defendants reasoned that the Pledge statute did not violate the
Massachusetts Constitution because a student could elect to abstain from participation for any or
no reason at all. See Defendants'Briefsupra note 26, at *13-14.
103 See Plaintiffs' Reply, supra note 19, at *2 (citing Iowa and Massachusetts high courts'
reasoning in legalizing same-sex marriage).
104 See supra note 66 and accompanying text (discussing decisions in Brown, Loving, and
McLaughlin).
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However, the plaintiffs' inability to show any specific occasions on
which their children were treated or perceived differently at school because
10 5
they did not recite the Pledge proved to be their biggest blunder.
Litigators seeking to bring an equal protection claim challenging the

constitutionality of the Pledge must be able to establish more than
a mere
10 6

feeling of being stigmatized or excluded in order to be cognizable.
Litigators seeking to challenge the phrase "under God" in the
Pledge should be mindful of their state's constitution when making an
Equal Protection argument. 0 7
State constitutions that specifically
enumerate "religion" or "creed" as a suspect classification in their Equal
Rights Amendments would serve as ideal forums. 0 8 This is because any
classification based on religion would be considered "suspect" and
therefore subject to a more heightened scrutiny. 0 9 In particular, those

105

See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text (discussing SJC's reasoning in rejecting

plaintiffs' equal protection claim); see also supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text (outlining
Justice Lenk's concurring opinion).
106 See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text (leaving open possibility of ERA violation
where plaintiff demonstrates Pledge engendered bullying or differential treatment).
107 See sources cited supra note 78 and accompanying text (identifying and describing Equal
Rights Amendments to twenty-one states' constitutions).
108 See CONN. CONST. art. I, § 20 ("No person shall be denied the equal protection of the law
nor be subjected to segregation or discrimination in the exercise or enjoyment of his or her civil
or political rights because of religion, race, color, ancestry, national origin, sex or physical or
mental disability."); FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2 ("All natural persons, female and male alike, are
equal before the law and have inalienable rights .... No person shall be deprived of any right
because of race, religion, national origin, or physical disability."); HAW. CONST. art. I, § 5 ("No
person shall be ... denied the equal protection of the laws, nor be denied the enjoyment of the
person's civil rights or be discriminated against in the exercise thereof because of race, religion,
sex or ancestry."); LA. CONST. art. I, § 3 ("No person shall be denied the equal protection of the
laws. No law shall discriminate against a person because of race or religious ideas, beliefs, or
affiliations. No law shall arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably discriminate against a person
because of birth, age, sex, culture, physical condition, or political ideas or affiliations."); MASS.
CONST. pt. I, art. I, amended by MASS. CONST. amend, art. CVI ("All people are born free and
equal and have certain natural, essential and unalienable rights .... Equality under the law shall
not be denied or abridged because of sex, race, color, creed, or national origin."); MONT. CONST.
art. II, § 4 ("The dignity of the human being is inviolable. No person shall be denied the equal
protection of the laws. Neither the state nor any person, firm, corporation, or institution shall
discriminate against any person in the exercise of his civil or political rights on account of race,
color, sex, culture, social origin or condition, or political or religious ideas."); N.H. CONST. pt. I,
art. II ("Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by this state on account of
race, creed, color, sex or national origin."); N.J. CONST. art. I, § 5 ("No person shall be denied the
enjoyment of any civil or military right, nor be discriminated against in the exercise of any civil
or military right, nor be segregated in the militia or in the public schools, because of religious
principles, race, color, ancestry or national origin."); TEx. CONST. art. I, § 3a ("Equality under the
law shall not be denied or abridged because of sex, race, color, creed, or national origin."); see
also supra note 71 and accompanying text (noting application of strict scrutiny when ERA
specifically enumerates suspect classifications).
109 See supra note 71 and accompanying text (noting application of strict scrutiny when ERA
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states that have judicially legalized same-sex marriage under their state
constitution would likely be the most advantageous." 0 These states in
particular have shown a willingness to broaden the rights afforded to their
citizens under their state's constitution."'
While the specific enumeration of religion as a suspect
classification makes it easier for the litigator, it is by no means necessary
for a viable claim." 2 Challengers in states whose constitution does not
specifically list religion as a suspect class are anything but barred from
bringing an equal protection claim, they, however, will face the challenge
of advocating for an application of heighted scrutiny."' On the other hand,
challengers in states with no Equal Rights Amendments to their state's
constitution would instead have to bring a claim under the Equal Protection
Clause of4 the Federal Constitution, which would likely prove to be
difficult.'

V. CONCLUSION
The state mandated daily recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance, as
currently read: "I pledge allegiance to the flag of the United States of
America, and to the Republic for which it stands, one Nation, under God,
indivisible, with liberty and justice for all" is a violation of the Equal
Rights Amendment to the Massachusetts Constitution. Although the SIC
did not find in favor of the plaintiffs in Doe v.Acton-Boxborough, the
plaintiffs still achieved a victory of their own. They got the SIC to address
this issue in depth, rather than gloss over it like so many other courts have
done. Notwithstanding the decision, the novel argument made in Doe will
likely ignite a wave of similar challenges in state courts across the country.
Litigants seeking to bring a challenge to the Pledge under an equal
protection claim should be mindful of the specific language of their state's
constitution. States that have shown a willingness to broaden the rights
afforded to their citizens under their state's constitution would serve as
particularly advantageous forums. With everyone once again talking about
specifically enumerates suspect classifications).
110 See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text (discussing same-sex marriage cases and
analysis applied by state high courts).
111See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text (noting broader liberties afforded under
some states' constitutions).
112 See supra note 71 and accompanying text (providing application of strict scrutiny for
specifically enumerated suspect classifications).
113 See supra notes 69-71 (outlining standards of equal protection analysis).
114 Cf cases cited supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text (citing two federal cases holding
Pledge did not violate Fourteenth Amendment).
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the constitutionality of the Pledge, the Supreme Court of the United States
will eventually have to stop avoiding this controversial issue.
Carlie S. Seigal

